KONTRA DAYA 2025 ELECTION REPORT
Protecting the People’s Vote – Before, During, and After May 12, 2025
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The 2025 Philippine midterm elections laid bare the failure of democratic integrity, marked by systemic fraud, disenfranchisement, and institutional complicity. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) continued to ignore and dismiss glaring anomalies as mere technical issues. From the pre-election period to the final canvassing of votes, the electoral process was riddled with irregularities that suppressed genuine voter representation and further consolidated elite power. Kontra Daya and Vote Report PH documented a wide array of violations before, during, and after election day. These included widespread vote-buying, illegal campaigning, misuse of public funds—such as the AKAP program—for partisan gain, and voter intimidation through red-tagging and disinformation. Particularly alarming were reports of disenfranchisement: voters turned away due to missing names, malfunctioning machines, or ballot rejection, as well as over 18 million rejected votes due to alleged “overvoting.” Overseas voting also suffered from a lack of effective public information and technical issues, contributing to historically low turnout. Meanwhile, the party-list system—originally designed to give voice to marginalized sectors—has been hijacked by political dynasties, big businesses, and state security forces. Forty (40) out of the 63 proclaimed party-list groups in the 20th Congress were flagged in Kontra Daya’s February 2025 data set. Notably, Duterte Youth and Bagong Henerasyon—whose proclamations were suspended by COMELEC due to pending cases—were also flagged by Kontra Daya for their links to either the military or big business. The automated election system (AES) was implemented without adequate transparency or public scrutiny. The late source code review, unverified software version changes, delayed or inconsistent transmission of results, and questionable suppliers like Miru Systems all point to a compromised electoral infrastructure. The presence of “transparency” servers during transmission, discrepancies in digital certificates, and over 15,000 precincts reporting faulty or duplicate files further eroded public trust. COMELEC’s refusal to acknowledge or investigate these failures reflects a dangerous lack of accountability. Kontra Daya continues to call for urgent reforms: replacing the AES with an open-source, hybrid election system (manual vote counting at the precinct level combined with electronic transmission of results); overhauling the party-list system; investigating foreign interference and troll operations; and holding COMELEC and its partners accountable. It also reiterates demands to de-cluster precincts and meaningfully consult election workers to address the burdens they face during election season. Without urgent, systemic reform and genuine accountability, Philippine elections will continue to serve the interests of the few—rather than reflect the democratic will of the Filipino people.
1. INTRODUCTION: WHO WE ARE AND WHAT WE DO
What is Kontra Daya? Kontra Daya (“Against Fraud”) is an election watchdog network composed of teachers, IT professionals, church workers, researchers, progressive groups, and concerned citizens. We are committed to safeguarding the integrity of Philippine elections through vigilant monitoring, public education and where imperative, legal action.
Our Activities in the 2025 Elections:
Educational Materials and Party List Research: We launched voters’ education seminars, aiming to inform voters about the current voting processes and mechanisms, as well as voters’ rights. We also released a study on party-list groups accredited by the COMELEC. The study, fact sheets and reports identified questionable party list groups backed by dynasties, business interests, and security forces; and aimed at educating the public on how the original intent of the party list system has been severely undermined.
Monitoring Election Violations and Irregularities: We documented reports of red-tagging, disinformation, vote-buying, and the use of public funds for campaigning. Our field volunteers and partner organizations helped verify and consolidate reports from across the country.
Mass Actions at COMELEC: Months before the elections, we held several protest actions and mobilizations at the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) office to call for the implementation of a hybrid electoral system; that is, manual counting of votes and automated transmission of election returns. Days before elections, we also trooped to the COMELEC office to raise concerns about disinformation campaigns, systemic cheating, and the lack of credible reforms in the electoral process. A day after the election, we held a protest mobilization at the Manila Hotel, the venue for the canvassing of election results. This was to expose the irregularities, questionable events and outright fraudulent activities we encountered throughout the whole election process.
Election Day Monitoring Center – May 12: On election day, we operated a Monitoring Center to receive, verify, and analyze real time reports from across the country. This included issues with voting machines, illegal campaigning and vote buying, as well as voter disenfranchisement.
2. KEY FINDINGS AND SYSTEMIC ISSUES
A. Prevalent Election Violations
Before Election Day
The Philippine midterm elections have been marred by reports of irregularities both before and during Election Day, according to monitoring by Vote Report PH. Kontra Daya and Vote Report PH have maintained a long-standing collaboration built on mutual trust and shared advocacy for electoral transparency and people’s participation. Vote Report PH, a citizen-based reporting platform, provides real time documentation of irregularities during election periods, including vote buying, machine malfunctions, illegal campaigning, and voter disenfranchisement. Kontra Daya, through its network, analyzes and amplifies these reports through public education, media engagement, and mass action.
Two months before elections, Vote Report PH released a preliminary report on March 14 about increasing cases of red-tagging and harassment of candidates and their campaigners/supporters and misuse of government resources for campaigning. In the lead-up to the polls, in their April 11 report, more incidents of vote buying, harassment of opponents, and misuse of government resources for campaigning were documented in several local races. In their May 10 report, top reports were red-tagging, disinformation and fake news spread widely online, which may have contributed to distorting voter perceptions.
Red-tagging and Political Harassment: Progressive party-list groups and candidates were targeted through disinformation campaigns that linked them with purported terrorist groups to intimidate their supporters and delegitimize their advocacies. On the last day of the campaign period, Facebook pages and social media posts were circulating false reports on the disqualification of the most prominent opposition and progressive party lists, actions apparently intended to confuse and mislead voters.
Use of Government Resources for Campaigning: Programs such as the Ayuda Para sa Kapos ang Kita Program (AKAP) were reportedly used by some incumbents to gain political advantage. These programs were selectively distributed, with visible endorsements of certain candidates or party lists during the campaign period. This constitutes a clear misuse of public resources for partisan gain.
Vote Buying: Widespread and Unpunished: Based on reports from Vote Report Ph, vote buying remained rampant, normalized, and largely unchecked by authorities. Reports from various parts of the country indicated that the going rate per vote reached up to P16,000 in some hotly contested areas. Despite numerous complaints and video evidence, enforcement remains weak. Few have been held accountable then and now.
On Election Day
On Election Day itself, Vote Report PH recorded operational disruptions, including delayed opening of polling precincts and malfunctioning vote-counting machines (VCMs), which caused long voter queues. More serious allegations emerged, such as voter intimidation and violence in election hotspots. These incidents raise serious concerns about the fairness and integrity of the electoral process.
Automated Counting Machine (ACM) Errors: Many areas reported malfunctioning machines, paper jams, and ballots being collected without confirmation of scanning. This led to confusion and, in some cases, voters leaving polling places uncertain whether their votes were counted. The Commission on Elections reported replacing at least 311 machines during the 2025 elections.
Disenfranchisement: Issues included long delays, missing names in voter lists, and ballot rejection. Overvoting cases and low voter turnout were especially evident in overseas voting, where poor coordination and limited access led to many being unable to vote. According to COMELEC data, overseas voter turnout in regions such as North and Latin America was as low as 7.19%, and only 24.15% in the Asia-Pacific region—both significantly lower than the 34.88% turnout recorded in the 2022 elections. This drastic drop has been attributed to the rushed implementation of the Online Voting and Counting System (OVCS), unclear enrollment instructions, and system glitches, all of which discouraged participation and prevented thousands from casting their votes. On the other hand, local cases of overvoting, which could have been due to ACM oversensitivity, reached more than 18 million, disenfranchising a huge percentage of the voting population.
Illegal Campaigning: Flyers, sample ballots, and campaign paraphernalia were seen inside or just outside polling stations. There were also reports of organized supporters engaging voters directly near precincts, violating election day campaigning rules.
B. Party List System Hijacked by Political Dynasties and Big Businesses
Although the party list system was intended to represent politically and socially marginalized groups, it continues to be dominated by:
Political families using party list groups as an extension of their dynastic power
Business-backed nominees advancing interests of large corporations
Candidates with ties to the military or police, undermining civilian representation
These groups often have the resources and political connections to win, leaving little space for genuine representatives of basic and under-represented sectors.
The party list system, instituted in the 1986 Philippine Constitution in the wake of the “people power” uprising that ousted a dictator, has increasingly become a tool for entrenched political families, big business interests, and security forces to expand and consolidate their power. These groups often field proxy nominees or use sectoral labels to disguise self-serving political agendas, crowding out genuine grassroots representation.
In its 2025 study, Kontra Daya analyzed the backgrounds of all accredited party-list groups and found that 86 of the 156 party-list groups participating in the 2025 polls had ties to vested interests — political clans, large corporations, or state security forces. Several nominees were revealed to be relatives of sitting politicians, former government officials, or known allies of powerful business groups. The research also showed that many of these groups misrepresented themselves as advocates for marginalized sectors despite having no clear track record of engagement with those communities. These findings confirm that the system is being manipulated to favor entrenched interests, undermining its purpose as a venue for genuine democratic representation. On May 19, Congress proclaimed 63 Party List groups as part of the 20th Congress. Forty (40) of these were among those flagged in Kontra Daya’s 2025 comprehensive study on Party Lists. It should also be noted that the proclamation of 2 of these 63 Party List groups – Duterte Youth and Bagong Henerasyon – were suspended by COMELEC due to pending cases. These 2-were also flagged by Kontra Daya for their links with military or big business.
C. Transparency Issues and Problems with the Automated Election System (AES)
The 2025 elections further exposed the deep and recurring flaws in the country’s Automated Election System (AES). Despite legal requirements meant to ensure transparency, accountability, and public trust, the actual implementation of the AES was marred by secrecy, questionable technical decisions, and inconsistencies that undermine the credibility of the electoral process. From the procurement of suppliers to the handling of source code, transmission of results, and validation of vote data, the conduct by the COMELEC raises serious concerns about its ability—and willingness—to uphold the integrity of automated elections.
Supplier Controversy: Miru Systems, the main supplier for the 2025 elections, had been flagged in previous international controversies. Despite initial disqualification during the bidding due to incomplete documentation, it was eventually awarded a PHP 17.9 billion contract. The project was implemented with local partners including companies with questionable links—one of which withdrew from the contract after conflict-of-interest concerns arose. Despite repeated calls for scrutiny, COMELEC proceeded without public hearings or a reassessment of Miru’s eligibility.
Lack of Transparency and Public Scrutiny: The election process suffered from severe transparency failures. The source code review process—required by law to conclude three months before election day—was completed only a week prior. Worse, the software version (v3.5.0) installed in Automated Counting Machines (ACMs) on election day had a different hash code than the one certified by international auditors (v3.4.0). This meant that the code actually used was not the code reviewed by experts and stakeholders. COMELEC provided three conflicting explanations in two days, none of which addressed the fundamental inconsistency. This raises serious questions of legality, accountability, and possible tampering.
COMELEC officials’ dismissal of these issues as minor and procedural not only violated principles of transparency but also raised serious questions about due process and respect for electoral safeguards. Such actions show a disregard for the Filipino people’s fundamental right to a transparent and accountable electoral system.
Transmission Failures and Result Delays: Numerous cases of problems were reported to Kontra Daya and Vote Report PH on election day regarding the transmission of election results. Some precincts reported delays or failures in transmitting Election Returns (ERs) from the Automated Counting Machines (ACMs) to the central servers. In other cases, the number of results transmitted did not match expected voter turnout. Discrepancies between local and national canvassing reports further fueled doubts about the credibility of the process.
These issues affected not only the speed of the count but also the perceived integrity of the results.
One of the most glaring problems was the delayed transmission of election returns (ERs) to civil society and media servers, which are designed to receive results at the same time as the COMELEC central server (See Annex for full quote from COMELEC Garcia declaring “Sa darating na election wala na po tayong transparency server…”). This system of parallel data delivery is a cornerstone of the AES transparency mechanism. In reality, it took over an hour before COMELEC-authorized watchdogs like PPCRV and NAMFREL began receiving any data while the COMELEC server had already collected over a third of the ERs. COMELEC dismissed the delays as minor technical issues but failed to explain why their own server was immune to these delays, which undermines public trust and confidence in the veracity of the results.
This is another issue that COMELEC brushed off. The function of multiple servers receiving election data all at the same time acts as a critical failsafe—allowing media, watchdog groups, and citizens to monitor the results in real time and verify consistency of voting results.
Digital Certificate and Data Integrity Concerns: Another issue was the reported absence or inconsistency of digital certificates in some SD cards used for vote counting. These certificates are supposed to authenticate vote data. There were also reports of unreadable or blank files, and even duplicate results affecting over 15,000 precincts. According to independent observers, these errors impacted the rankings of over 7,000 candidates. COMELEC later issued corrected files manually, further eroding confidence in the automated system’s integrity, reliability and accuracy.
3. CONCLUSION AND CALLS TO ACTION
The 2025 midterm elections once again exposed serious flaws in the country’s electoral system. COMELEC’s failure to undertake serious investigation into major anomalies throughout the election process is not just a bureaucratic shortcoming but can be construed as deliberate and enabling egregious election fraud. COMELEC consistently failed to acknowledge much less investigate key anomalies, such as the hash code mismatch, delays in transmission, and the unexplained presence of duplicate or unverifiable election returns. Instead of initiating independent inquiries or opening their systems to public audit, COMELEC often resorted to public denials, calling these problems “fake news” or blaming them on transmission congestion. This behavior manifests a systemic lack of transparency and accountability and a blatant disregard for due process in a supposedly democratic political exercise.
From pre-election violations to election day errors and post-election irregularities, it is clear that the COMELEC failed to ensure a clean, transparent, and credible electoral process. This failure is due in large part to the numerous fatal errors and systemic issues observed throughout the election period which include the malfunctioning of Automated Counting Machines (ACMs), last-minute software changes, and transmission delays. And most glaring in this election is the large number of Filipinos who were disenfranchised, especially among overseas voters, many of whom were simply unable to vote, and the millions of voters who had their votes go uncounted due to supposed overvoting.
These incidents not only reflect technical shortcomings but also a broader failure in leadership and accountability on the part of the COMELEC. Compounding all these is the fact that these criticisms are, in essence, the same as the criticisms raised to the COMELEC during the 2022 National Elections. COMELEC has failed to act decisively towards ensuring the credibility of the electoral process.
We reiterate the urgent need to reform key components of our electoral system:
Reform the Party-list System. COMELEC should immediately resolve pending cases against dubious Party List groups. Furthermore, the 2013 Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC Supreme Court ruling which effectively broadened the interpretation of who can participate in the party list elections. This ruling enabled political dynasties, business interests, and military-backed groups to dominate a space meant for the marginalized. That the party list system has been hijacked by political dynasties, business interests, and military-backed groups needs to be challenged.
Remedial legislation is an urgent need, to restore the original spirit of the Party List Law (RA 7941). A growing number of voices are already calling for the abolition of the party list system citing systemic abuse and failure to fulfill its democratic promise.
All of these will require strong and sustained efforts at bringing public opinion to bear on these reform measures at the Supreme Court or in Congress.
Replace the Automated Election System (AES). The 2025 elections have shown that the AES is fundamentally flawed, lacking transparency, accountability, and public trust. Work with and consult the local IT community and Filipino-owned IT companies towards developing an open source AES.
Investigate Reports of Foreign Interference. An investigation should be held regarding the reported hiring of troll armies to spread disinformation and manipulate public opinion.
Adopt a Hybrid Election System. Implement manual vote counting at the precinct level (to ensure transparency and restore public confidence) combined with electronic transmission of results to speed up the canvassing process while preserving verifiability. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) possesses the authority under Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by RA 9369 which provides COMELEC flexibility to draft its IRR, that includes implementing a hybrid system.
De-clusterize Polling Precincts. We reiterate the call to de-clusterize the precincts. Clustering multiple precincts into a single voting location leads to long lines, voter disenfranchisement, and chaos on Election Day. Returning to single precincts per barangay or splitting large voting centers would streamline the process, reduce bottlenecks, and ensure a smoother, more accessible voting experience. De-clusterization will minimize opportunities for election fraud, as smaller, well-organized precincts are easier to monitor.
Consult Election Service Workers. We urge the COMELEC to consult election service workers—including teachers, poll clerks, and technical staff. The lack of hazard pay, insufficient security, and even intimidation from political operatives puts them at risk. Addressing their concerns would not only uphold their rights but also prevent election disruptions from overburdened personnel.
Hold COMELEC accountable. Investigations must be made into the commission’s decisions, particularly its mishandling of the election process, and its partnerships, especially involving suppliers like Miru.
Elections must reflect the will of the people, not the interests of the powerful few. A genuine democracy demands nothing less. #
This report was prepared by Kontra Daya’s 2025 Election Monitoring Team with contributions from field volunteers and partner organizations across the Philippines.
References
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights. (2025, May 16). Machine failures, dynasties, harassment and no secret ballot: Southeast Asian MPs question 2025 Philippine midterms integrity. https://aseanmp.org/publications/post/machine-failures-dynasties-harassment-and-no-secret-ballot-southeast-asian-mps-question-2025-philippine-midterms-integrity
ABS-CBN News. (2025, May 13). Halalan 2025: Overseas Filipinos in US frustrated by low turnout in online voting. https://www.abs-cbn.com/news/world/2025/5/13/halalan-2025-overseas-filipinos-in-us-frustrated-by-low-turnout-in-online-voting-1007ABS-CBN
Center for People’s Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG). (2019). The 2019 elections: Problems and recommendations for electoral reform. CenPEG Policy Brief No. 24. https://www.cenpeg.org
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). (2025, May 13). Statement on the midterm elections and automated election system issues. https://comelec.gov.ph
Gita-Carlos, R. (2025, May 14). COMELEC: ACM errors ‘minor,’ do not affect election outcome. Philippine News Agency. https://www.pna.gov.ph
GMA News Online. (2025, May 13). Asian poll observers flag abuse of ayuda, vote-buying. https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/946418/election-2025-asian-poll-observers-anfrel-flag-ayuda-vote-buying/story/
GMA News Online. (2025, May 11). Election violence, vote-buying recorded ahead of May 12 polls — observers. https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/945694/election-violence-vote-buying-recorded-ahead-of-may-12-polls-observers/story/
Kontra Daya. (2025, February 12). More than half of party-list groups do not represent marginalized sectors – Kontra Daya. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/kontra.daya/posts/960770612816659
Kontra Daya. (2025, May 13). Kontra Daya monitors widespread election irregularities and machine failures on May 13. https://kontradaya.org/2025electionmonitoring
Malasig, J. (2025, May 13). Transparency server data delays spark concern during midterm elections. Interaksyon. https://interaksyon.philstar.com
Maru, D. (2025, May 14). Delayed transmission to transparency server raises questions. ABS-CBN News. https://news.abs-cbn.com
Patag, K. (2025, May 14). Vote-buying rampant despite being illegal – watchdogs. Philstar.com. https://www.philstar.com
Philippine Star. (2025, May 15). Opinion: Glitches. https://www.philstar.com/opinion/2025/05/15/2443139/glitches
Philippine News Agency. (2025, May 16). Comelec reports low overseas voting turnout at 18.12%. https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1250271
Rappler. (2025, May 15). Overseas voters report late ballots, unclear procedures. https://www.rappler.com
Santos, E. (2025, May 15). Overseas voters report late ballots, unclear procedures. Rappler. https://www.rappler.com
Tuazon, B. (2025, April 25). Red-tagging and disinformation intensify ahead of elections. Bulatlat. https://www.bulatlat.com
Villanueva, J. (2025, March 28). Party-list system a tool for dynasties and elites – study. Manila Today. https://manilatoday.net
Williams, C. (2025, May 16). Filipino bishops hit vote buying, urge vigilance after 2025 elections. Crux. https://cruxnow.com/church-in-asia/2025/05/filipino-bishops-hit-vote-buying-urge-vigilance-after-2025-elections
Xave, G. (2025, May 14). Vote buying well-entrenched in Philippine elections — EU observers. Philstar.com. https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2025/05/14/2443125/vote-buying-well-entrenched-philippine-elections-eu-observers
VERA Files. (2024, December 29). 2025 elections: Will more transparency translate to credible results? https://verafiles.org/articles/2025-elections-will-more-transparency-translate-to-credible-results
Vote Report PH (2025, May 10) Final Report on Campaign Violations. https://www.facebook.com/VoteReportPH/posts/pfbid02BTTgER2vQi239weaLsjGXAVqAdYXuSXnhndw1a3rVhV9rp5f6EwRPagKAbgq9dJdl
Annexes
Visual Chart of Top Election Campaign Violations [March, April, May 2025]
Visual examples of campaign violations
Infographic on cases of election related violence
Kontra Daya’s assessment of the Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) live demonstration of the automated counting machine (ACM) to be used in the 2025 polls
Protests in front of COMELEC [Pre and Post Elections]
KD Voter’s Education
KD Media interviews pre-election
KD joins ABS-CBN Halalan 2025
COMELEC Chair Garcia full quote regarding transparency servers from Vera Files
ANNEX 1
Visual Chart of Top Election Campaign Violations [March, April, May 2025]
Initial Report of Campaign Violations as of March 14, 2025
Updated Reports of Campaign Violations as of April 11, 2025
Final Report of Campaign Violations as of May 10, 2025
ANNEX 2
Visual Examples of Campaign Violations
Dayaan sa Eleksyon: Mga Dapat Mong Malaman
ANNEX 3
Infographic on cases of election related violence
(As of April 11, 2025)
ANNEX 4
Kontra Daya’s assessment of the Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) live demonstration of the automated counting machine (ACM) to be used in the 2025 polls
ANNEX 5
Protests in front of COMELEC [Pre and Post Elections]
ANNEX 6
Kontra Daya Voter’s Education
ANNEX 7
Kontra Daya Media Interviews
Photo: PinoyWeekly
ANNEX 8
Kontra Daya Joins ABS-CBN Halalan 2025
ANNEX 9
Full quote from VERA Files Commentary Section, by-line by Tita Valderrama.
No more transparency servers
To counter check the election results, another group, iOne Resources Inc., has been contracted to supply the Secure Electronic Transmission Services. Electronic results of the elections will be sent from Miru’s automated counting machines directly to the consolidation and canvassing systems, the National Board of Canvassers and data centers, which will be accessible to different stakeholders such as the Comelec, the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV), the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel), the dominant majority and minority parties, and the media.
“Sa darating na election wala na po tayong transparency server… kasi doon po nagkakaproblema. Lahat ng pinanggagalingan ng results dun lang sa transparency server, eh, paano kung nagkaproblema sa transparency server, paano kung nabulunan sa transparency server?… Ngayon po the strategy is from the precincts ‘yung result ng bawat presinto mata-transmit ito sa lahat ng entities tulad ng PPCRV, Namfrel, majority and minority parties, and [the] media. So there will be five entities that will be practically receiving the results coming from the precincts para sila-sila na mismo magko-compare among themselves. Meron po silang data center na ang Comelec mismo ang magse-set up ng data centers na ito,” Garcia explained.